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#BLOCKEDBYTRUMP: WHY A GOVERNMENT-RUN SOCIAL 
MEDIA PAGE ON A PRIVATELY-RUN PLATFORM 
CANNOT BE A PUBLIC FORUM 
 
A. J. Colkitt† 
 
ABSTRACT 
     Ten years ago, it would have been hard to imagine regular news stories 
opening with the phrase, “The President announced in a tweet today.” Yet in 
today’s reality, use of social media is an increasingly accepted norm for 
government officials. Although the concept may sound juvenile on the 
surface, the use of social networking platforms has been gaining more and 
more traction among public officials in the United States. With this rise in 
popularity, it is inevitable that tough legal issues will arise. In particular, 
social media has challenged courts to determine exactly what protections 
should be afforded to both public officials and users of social media 
platforms.  
     As private companies, social media websites maintain an immense 
amount of control over their platforms and the users of their websites. Not 
only may these companies restrict the speech of their users and suspend any 
user’s account, but the terms that users agree to follow are also subject to 
change at any time. This is because, since these companies are not 
government agents, users are not guaranteed a right to free speech on the 
companies’ respective platforms. 
     Despite the control that these private companies may exercise over their 
users, the District Court for the Southern District of New York held that the 
doctrine of public forum applies to the Twitter account run by President 
Donald Trump. Specifically, the court held that the President designated the 
space as a place where the public could converse without government 
restriction. Thus, the court held that President Trump violated the plaintiffs’ 
First Amendment rights when he blocked their accounts from viewing and 
commenting on his posts. 
                                                
† A.J. Colkitt, Juris Doctor Candidate, Liberty University School of Law, May 2020. I 
would like to thank my amazing wife, family, and mentors for all of their help and 
encouragement through the process of writing this Note. All of your support has been 
instrumental. 
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     This ruling could have a devastating impact on the law of public forum 
and the general public’s First Amendment rights. By classifying a 
government-run social media page as a public forum, the court gave private 
companies the authority to restrict the speech of citizens in a public forum. 
Because Twitter is not a government entity, the restrictions that it places on 
its users are not subject to the same strict scrutiny as any restrictions imposed 
by a public employee. Such a rule would grant private companies the right to 
censor individuals in a way that would not be permissible if the government 
attempted to do the same. This would open a dangerous door to privatized 
censorship. 
     Because the website owners have discretion to impose limits on their users, 
it is unreasonable to hold that a user has a guaranteed right to free speech on 
the platform. Thus, instead of categorizing government-run social media 
pages as a public forum, courts should limit public figures’ use of social media 
to the exercise of government speech. Such a limited rule would retain the 
majority of the benefits of government social media use while eliminating the 
immense risk of privatized censorship. Under this rule, officials’ social media 
pages and posts would be treated in the same way as all other government 
speech. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
     Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, Instagram, Snapchat, Reddit—the never-
ending list of social media platforms can be difficult to keep up with at times. 
However, it is undeniable that the Internet has made it far easier for people 
across the globe to interact with one another. In recent years, government 
officials have taken to social networking sites to communicate with their 
constituents. This trend is not limited to the United States; governments 
around the world are increasingly making use of this new mode of 
communication. In fact, in 2014, twenty-six out of thirty-four member 
countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
reported that their executive officials had created official social media 
accounts to communicate to the masses.1 Such use of social networking sites 
has proven incredibly beneficial, as government officials can disseminate 
information to their constituents in a quick and easy manner.2 However, with 
this new use of social media, it is inevitable that this “official” use of social 
media creates novel and complex legal questions. Chief among these 
                                                
1.  Arthur Mickoleit, Social Media Use by Governments: A Policy Primer To Discuss Trends, 
Identify Policy Opportunities and Guide Decision Makers 2 (Org. for Econ. Co-operation and 
Dev., Working Papers on Pub. Governance No. 26, 2014). 
2.  Lyrissa Lidsky, Public Forum 2.0, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1975, 2004 (2011). 
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questions is the foundational inquiry: how should courts treat government-
run social media pages?  
     In March 2018, the Second Circuit attempted to answer precisely this 
question in Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University v. 
Trump, where the Second Circuit held that the Twitter page 
@realDonaldTrump is a “designated public forum.”3 This means that 
government officials who operate “official” social media pages of government 
officials, such as President Donald Trump, would not have the constitutional 
authority to “block” accounts from accessing and interacting with their page 
on the basis of disagreeing with the commenter, as it would be considered 
impermissible viewpoint discrimination.4  
     On the surface, such a restriction seems reasonable; after all, it would seem 
in the government’s best interest to protect freedom of speech by allowing all 
members of the public to view and sound off on this platform. On the other 
hand, should this standard be applied uniformly, this precedent could grant 
private individuals and institutions the power to significantly restrict the 
public’s access to a forum specifically designed to be open to the public. Given 
the immense amount of power and control that the sites hold over the users 
and pages on their platform, users may be denied access to public fora 
without the benefit of due process. Thus, instead of applying the confusing 
and ill-fitting classification of “public forum” to government-run social 
media pages, courts should not treat these pages as an area to converse; 
rather, these accounts should only be used as a means to disseminate 
government speech to the general public.  
II. BACKGROUND 
     Before analyzing the impact of the application of the public forum 
doctrine on social media platforms, there must be an understanding of the 
often-confusing foundations of both public fora and social networking 
websites. Specifically, it is vital to understand first, what constitutes a public 
forum, how social media sites are structured for the users and for the 
companies controlling the platform, and how the doctrine of public fora has 
already been applied to pages created by public officials wishing to 
communicate with their constituents.  
 
 
 
                                                
3.  Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 
2019). 
4.  Id. at 234. 
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A. Law of Public Fora 
     An analysis of government-run social media pages requires an 
understanding of the jurisprudence surrounding public fora. The public 
forum protects individuals from government censorship and exists where 
“government property has by law or tradition been given the status of a public 
forum.”5 Where a public forum exists, the government may only place 
“content neutral, time, place, and manner restrictions or content-based” 
restrictions on the individual’s speech.6 Content-based restrictions, however, 
must be subject to strict scrutiny.7 
     The Supreme Court has recognized that there are three ways that property 
can be construed as a public forum by either tradition or law.8 The first 
avenue involves spaces that have been open for public discourse by virtue of 
“long tradition or by government fiat.”9 These traditional public fora include 
sidewalks, public parks, and other areas that are considered “quintessential” 
public areas.10 The second avenue identified by the Supreme Court is non-
public fora.11 This category is reserved for instances where the government 
specifically opens a piece of public property not generally considered a public 
forum.12 Finally, the Supreme Court has recognized that the government may 
create a designated public forum.13  
     In this last category, the government may “create a public forum, for 
purposes of the First Amendment free speech protections, by its designation 
of a place or channel of communication for use by the public at large for 
assembly and speech, for use by certain speakers, or for discussion of certain 
subjects.”14 Here, the government must deliberately open a place for the 
public to engage in expressive activity.15 This designation cannot be 
unintentional.16 Furthermore, the government must specifically intend to 
“make the property generally available to a class of speakers.”17 While the 
government may limit the public forum to a specific class, a public forum is 
                                                
5.  16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 540 (2009). 
6.  Id. 
7.  Id. 
8.  Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45–46 (1983). 
9.  Id. at 45. 
10.  Id.  
11.  Id. at 46.  
12.  Id.  
13.  Id. at 45. 
14.  16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 541 (1979). 
15.  Perry, 460 U.S. at 45. 
16.  Ark. Educ. Tv Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 679 (1998) (citations omitted). 
17.  Id. at 679 (citations omitted). 
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not created when only specific members of the class are granted permission 
to use the designated public forum.18 
     While a public forum generally exists on government-owned property, the 
Supreme Court has also found that a designated public forum can be created 
on private property.19 This, however, is only reserved for limited 
circumstances: the private property must be controlled in such a way that the 
property has adopted the functions and workings of a town government.20 
This would include residential buildings, sewage systems, and business 
blocks.21 Thus, as a general matter, public fora are limited to places where the 
government has control over the premises. However, a designated public 
forum can exist in one other context: the government must exercise control 
over the property that is intended for public discourse.22 This analysis may 
apply to property in the government’s charge, even if the government does 
not have legal title to the property.23 The Supreme Court held that private 
property can be a public forum if the government exercises sufficient control 
over the property and opens the property for public discourse.24 Therefore, 
the doctrine of designated public fora may apply to private property when 
the property is intentionally open to public discourse and subject to 
government control, regardless of actual government ownership. 
B. Nature of Social Media Platforms 
     While a public forum may be created on private property, social 
networking sites have proven difficult to categorize. Unlike private property 
typically converted to a public forum, the Internet has no physical space that 
may be occupied by either the government or individuals wishing to express 
themselves. However, the Supreme Court has not found this problematic and 
has held that a “metaphysical” public forum can be created.25 While this may 
seem reasonable on the surface, the categorization of social media sites poses 
multiple issues that are not readily apparent. First, in order to participate in 
social media platforms, users must agree to the platform’s respective terms of 
                                                
18.  Id. 
19.  Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946). 
20.  See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976). 
21.  Id. at 516 (citing Marsh, 326 U.S. at 502). 
22.  Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 801 (1985). 
23.  Id. 
24.  Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 555 (1975). 
25.  Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830 (1995). 
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service.26 For example, sending a tweet or responding to another user’s tweet 
on Twitter requires the user first to have an account. By clicking the “sign up” 
button, users are met with a message that reads, “By signing up, you agree to 
the Terms of Service and Privacy Policy, including Cookie Use.”27 Similarly, 
users creating a Facebook account are informed that, by signing up, they 
agree to the “Terms, Data Policy and Cookies Policy.”28  
     Both Twitter and Facebook present a “take-it-or-leave-it” contract to the 
users that leaves no room for negotiation. Failure to follow these terms could 
potentially result in an indefinite ban of the user’s account from the 
respective platform.29 The second and even more concerning consideration 
is the fact that the terms of service are constantly subject to change.30 In 
particular, both platforms have expressly reserved, within their terms of 
service, the right to amend the terms at any time.31 In an official public post, 
Twitter even explained that their policies are a “living document” and that 
Twitter is constantly “working to update, refine, and improve both our 
enforcement and our policies, informed by in-depth research around trends 
in online behavior both on and off Twitter, feedback from the people who 
use Twitter, and input from a number of external entities, including members 
of our Trust & Safety Council.”32 This means that a user’s conduct may 
conform to the platform’s rules one day and the next be the cause of their 
account’s indefinite removal from the platform.33 
     After agreeing to the Terms of Service and Privacy Policy, users are given 
the ability to create their profile and begin interacting on the platform. Once 
users create their profile, they may create “posts” using their account. These 
                                                
26.  See Twitter Terms of Service, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/en/tos (last visited Oct. 27, 
2018); Terms of Service, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/terms.php (last visited Oct. 27, 
2018). 
27.  Create Your Account, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/i/flow/signup (last visited Oct. 27, 
2018). 
28.  “Sign Up,” FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com (last visited Oct. 27, 2018). 
29.  See Twitter Terms of Service, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/en/tos (last visited Oct. 27, 
2018); Terms of Service, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/terms.php (last visited Oct. 27, 
2018). 
30.  See Twitter Terms of Service, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/en/tos (last visited Oct. 27, 
2018); Terms of Service, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/terms.php (last visited Oct. 27, 
2018). 
31.  Twitter Terms of Service, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/en/tos (last visited Oct. 27, 
2018); Terms of Service, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/terms.php (last visited Oct. 27, 
2018). 
32.  Del Harvey, The Twitter Rules: A Living Document, TWITTER (Aug. 7, 2018), 
https://blog.twitter.com/official/en_us/topics/company/2018/TheTwitterRulesALivingDocu
ment.html. 
33.  See id. 
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posts, once created, are then distributed by the platform so that, depending 
on the user’s privacy settings, others with accounts may view the post and 
potentially respond to the user. The ability to post and comment on the 
platform, however, raises an odd question that must be asked about the page 
itself: who is responsible for the information and content of the post? There 
is a strange dichotomy to social media platforms, in that the sites themselves 
publish the posts that users create, despite the fact that the platforms have not 
“created” the speech themselves. In Sikhs for Justice “SFJ”, Inc. v. Facebook, 
Inc., the plaintiff operated a page on Facebook that focused on the “plight of 
religious minorities of India and their treatment by successive Indian 
Governments and promotes independence for Sikhs in the Indian state of 
Punjab.”34 However, Facebook blocked access to the plaintiff’s page in India.35 
Facebook did so without providing any notice to the plaintiff.36  
     The plaintiff filed suit alleging that Facebook discriminated against the 
plaintiff on the basis of “race, religion, ancestry, and national origin.”37 
However, the Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiff failed to establish that 
Facebook could be held liable for “discriminatory conduct” since Facebook 
is merely a publisher of the plaintiff’s information.38 Under this standard, the 
publisher is able to review, edit, and decide whether to publish or withdraw 
any content from a third party.39 This is due to the immunity provided to 
publishers under the Communications Decency Act.40 Thus, Facebook was 
justified in refusing to publish the plaintiff’s content in India and, by 
extension, remove users’ posts from their website altogether.41 This is because 
this authority is within Facebook’s discretion as the publisher.42 Therefore, 
because social media sites are merely publishers, social networking 
companies, such as Facebook and Twitter, may outright refuse to give users 
the ability to use their platforms to publish their posts or disseminate their 
speech. 
     Once the user creates a post and the platform publishes the post on the 
user’s profile, the post affords others the opportunity to directly respond to 
                                                
34.  See Sikhs for Justice “SFJ”, Inc. v. Facebook, Inc., 144 F. Supp. 3d 1088, 1090 (N.D. 
Cal. 2015), aff’d Sikhs for Justice, Inc. v. Facebook, Inc., 697 Fed. Appx. 526 (9th Cir. 2017) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
35.  Id. 
36.  Id. 
37.  Id. 
38.  Id. at 1095. 
39.  Id. at 1094. 
40.  Sikhs, 144 F. Supp. 3d at 1094; 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2011). 
41.  Sikhs, 144 F. Supp. 3d at 1095–96. 
42.  Id. 
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the content. This is done in an area called the “comment section.” This area 
of the platform, however, may not be open to all people with an account on 
the platform. Both Facebook and Twitter give the individual users the ability 
to “block” other accounts from accessing the comment sections of their 
posts.43 This understanding of how social media operates and how a “block” 
impacts the users on the platform is foundational to understanding how the 
courts have misunderstood the nature of the platform of social media and the 
application of the doctrine of public forum to government-run pages. 
C. Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University v. Trump 
     In recent years, the realms of public fora and social media have intersected. 
As the use of social media to communicate with a wide audience has become 
increasingly prominent among government officials, courts have been faced 
with the difficult task of classifying these government-run social media pages. 
In May of 2018, the District Court for the Southern District of New York held 
that Twitter accounts and the ability to directly reply to tweets are classified 
as a designated public forum.44  
     In Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University v. Trump, the 
plaintiffs had been individually banned by President Trump from viewing 
and commenting on the President’s tweets from his account 
@realDonaldTrump.45 President Trump stipulated that the plaintiffs were 
directly banned because they had been critical of the President and his 
policies.46 As a result of President Trump’s block, the plaintiffs were unable 
to view or directly reply to any of the tweets from the account 
@realDonaldTrump.47 The Knight First Amendment Institute brought the 
suit on the basis that it desired to “read comments that otherwise would have 
been posted by the blocked plaintiffs, and by other accounts blocked by 
@realDonaldTrump, in direct reply to @realDonaldTrump tweets . . . .”48 
     In analyzing the nature of the plaintiffs’ speech, the district court turned 
to the application of the doctrine of public fora.49 Specifically, the court 
narrowed its focus to the control that President Trump exercises over both 
                                                
43.  See How To Block Accounts on Twitter, TWITTER, https://help.twitter.com/en/using-
twitter/blocking-and-unblocking-accounts (last visited Jan. 12, 2019); Blocking People, 
FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/290450221052800 (last visited Jan. 12, 2019). 
44.  Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 
(S.D.N.Y. 2018) [hereinafter Knight]. 
45.  Id. at 553. 
46.  Id. at 553–54. 
47.  Id. at 554. 
48.  Id. 
49.  Id. at 565. 
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the posts and the ability to prevent others from using the comment sections 
to the posts made by his account @realDonaldTrump.50 The court found that 
President Trump and the White House Director of Social Media Dan Scavino 
had sufficient governmental control over the account.51 While the opinion 
mentioned in passing the fact that Twitter is a “private” company that 
maintains control over “all . . . Twitter accounts,” the court was more 
interested in the amount of control that the government exercised over the 
content of the tweets and accounts authorized to interact with the tweets 
from the account.52 In particular, the court found that President Trump and 
Director Scavino’s ability to create the content of each tweet and block 
specific accounts from viewing and responding to the tweets published by the 
account was sufficient to establish government control over the account 
@realDonaldTrump.53  
     Additionally, the court held that the President intended to create a 
designated public forum.54 This was because Scavino had previously told the 
general public that the President’s account was to be used “as a means 
through which the President ‘communicates directly with you, the American 
people!’”55 While neither Scavino nor President Trump mentioned that the 
account could be used for the public to communicate back to the President, 
the Second Circuit analyzed the nature of the platform to determine the 
intent of President Trump.56 Specifically, the court looked to the Supreme 
Court where the Court held that Twitter could be used to “petition their 
elected representatives and otherwise engage with them in a direct manner.”57 
As previously mentioned, a designated public forum can exist if the 
opportunity to speak is generally available to a class of speakers.58 The court 
in Knight seemed to insinuate that the class of speakers designated for the 
comment section was either the general public or individuals with a Twitter 
account.59 
     In its analysis, the court examined several factors, including the 
President’s “policy and past practice, as well as the nature of the property and 
                                                
50.  Knight, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 566–67. 
51.  Id. at 566. 
52.  Id. at 566–67. 
53.  Id. 
54.  Id. at 574. 
55.  Id. 
56.  See Knight, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 574. 
57.  Id. (citing Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017)). 
58.  Id. 
59.  Id. 
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its compatibility with expressive activity.”60 To the policy and practice, the 
court pointed to statements made by Director Scavino where he represented 
to the people that the account was a means by which the President could 
communicate directly with the masses.61 Further, the court held that the 
account itself and the posts made by the account were accessible to the 
general public, provided that they had a Twitter account and were not 
blocked from the President’s own Twitter account.62  
     In analyzing the nature and compatibility of the account in question, the 
court held that “the interactive space of a tweet can accommodate an 
unlimited number of replies and retweets.”63 This, the court held, was more 
than sufficient to establish the requisite interactivity and compatibility with 
the “intended” use.64 Thus, due to the specific designation of the “open” 
space, the government control over the space, and the apparent intent to 
open the account to public discourse, the court held that the Twitter account 
@realDonaldTrump was a designated public forum.65 Because of this 
classification, the court held that the ban on the plaintiffs’ accounts was 
impermissible viewpoint discrimination, inconsistent with the First 
Amendment.66 Thus, the court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs.67  
     Here, the court recognized another vital point: posts created by President 
Trump were not susceptible to the analysis under the doctrine of public 
forum.68 This was because the President’s posts constituted “government 
speech.”69 Based on the facts of the record, the court concluded that President 
Trump used the account to “announce, describe, and defend his policies; to 
promote his Administration’s legislative agenda; to announce official 
decisions; to engage with foreign political leaders; to publicize state visits; to 
challenge media organizations whose coverage of his Administration he 
believes to be unfair; and for other statements . . . .”70  
     All of these uses were consistent with the three requirements for 
government speech: First, the tweets were used to convey a state message.71 
                                                
60.  Id. (quoting Paulsen v. County of Nassau, 925 F.2d 65, 69 (2d Cir. 1991)). 
61.  Knight, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 574. 
62.  Id. 
63.  Id. at 573. 
64.  Id. at 574–75. 
65.  Id. at 574. 
66.  Id. at 577. 
67.  Knight, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 580. 
68.  Id. at 571. 
69.  Id.  
70.  Id. 
71.  Id. 
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Second, the posts were often closely identified with the government, since the 
President himself or his staff was creating and disseminating the posts.72 
Finally, the President maintained direct control over the content of the 
posts.73 In so ruling, the court held that public officials might use social media 
accounts to disseminate official government speech to the public.74 While this 
holding is collateral to the ruling that the comment section is a public forum, 
in general, it is monumental for determining the classification of government 
use of social media. 
D. Second Circuit Appeal 
     Soon after the ruling, President Trump appealed the decision arguing that 
the Twitter account @realDonaldTrump was a personal account that had no 
element of government control.75 Specifically, President Trump contended 
that he had created the account prior to his run for, and subsequent election 
to, public office.76 According to President Trump, the mere fact that he 
became a public official did not transform his account into a government-
run platform for the purpose of public forum analysis.77 Regarding the 
platform itself, President Trump asserted that “Twitter as a whole could be 
characterized as a private forum for public expression—though not a ‘public 
forum’ in the First Amendment sense, given its non-governmental 
character.”78 Presumably, the individual pages on the platform that are run 
by government entities or officials could be classified as a public forum given 
the amount of government control. 
     In response to the President’s brief, Knight First Amendment Institute at 
Columbia University argued that President Trump used the account 
@realDonaldTrump in his official governmental capacity.79 Knight argued 
that because the Twitter account allowed the public to “hear from the 
President about matters relating to government, respond to him directly, and 
engage with one another about his and his administration’s statements and 
policies,” the President’s use of Twitter constituted official government use.80 
                                                
72.  Id. 
73.  Knight, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 571. 
74.  Id. 
75.  Brief for Appellants at 19, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 
928 F.3d 226 (2nd Cir. Aug. 7, 2018) (No. 18-1691). 
76.  Id. at 22. 
77.  Id. 
78.  Id. at 32. 
79.  Brief for Appellees at 12, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 
928 F.3d 226 (2nd Cir. Oct. 12, 2018) (No. 18-1691). 
80.  Id. at 12–13. 
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This would place the decision to block the plaintiffs from accessing his 
account within the First Amendment.81 Therefore, because the President 
outright admitted to blocking the plaintiffs based on their expressed 
disagreement with his policies,82 the action was improper viewpoint 
discrimination.83  
     After hearing oral arguments, the Second Circuit affirmed the lower 
court’s decision that President Trump created a public forum in the space of 
his Twitter account.84 The court began its analysis by examining the nature 
of public fora and the First Amendment.85 The court recognized several 
principles from the Supreme Court: First, social media platforms could be 
used for First Amendment expression.86 Second, basic principles of the First 
Amendment do not vary when a new mode of communication is used.87 
Finally, a public forum can exist absent a physical location and can exist in a 
metaphysical forum.88  
     Taking all three of these principles together, the Second Circuit examined 
whether a public forum was created by President Trump.89 The court adopted 
the Supreme Court test in Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Education 
Fund and examined both “the nature of the property and its compatibility 
with expressive activity to discern the government’s intent” and whether the 
government opened the forum for indiscriminate use by the public.90 From 
the outset, the court rejected President Trump’s claim that he merely 
exercised control over his private, personal account and instead held that the 
account was government-controlled property.91 This followed a particularly 
noteworthy concession by President Trump on oral argument that the 
account is not “independent of [his] presidency.”92 Because of this 
                                                
81.  Id. at 13. 
82.  See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541, 
553–55 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). 
83.  Brief for Appellees at 13, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 
No. 18-1691 (2nd Cir. Oct. 12, 2018) (No. 18-1691). 
84.  Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226, 233–34 (2d 
Cir. 2019). 
85.  Id. at 237. 
86.  Id. (citing Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735–36 (2017)). 
87.  Id. (quoting Brown v. Entm’t Merchants Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 790 (2011)). 
88.  Id. (citing Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 830 
(1995)). 
89.  Id. 
90.  Knight, 928 F.3d at 237 (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 
U.S. 788, 802 (1985); Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 47 (1983)). 
91.  Id. at 236. 
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connection, the court held that the President’s conduct created the public 
forum because the account and interactive comment section were 
intentionally opened for public discussion without limitation.93 Thus, when 
President Trump burdened the speech of the plaintiffs, he engaged in 
impermissible viewpoint discrimination.94 
     Oddly, the Second Circuit seemed to expressly ignore the question of 
whether a public forum can even exist when a private entity maintains 
pervasive control over the platform and speech of its users.95 The court 
overtly stated that it would not consider “whether private social media 
companies are bound by the First Amendment when policing their 
platforms.”96 Instead, the Second Circuit zeroed in on whether a public 
official may exclude individuals from participating in an online dialogue that 
would have been “otherwise-open.”97 However, in their characterization and 
description of Twitter as a platform, the court did not even acknowledge 
Twitter’s ability to block, remove, or delete content posted by its users.98 
     In the final paragraph of its opinion, the Second Circuit leaves the reader 
with a short philosophical dissertation. The court noted the “irony” of the 
litigants’ timing given the passion and robustness of modern debate.99 Thus, 
the court made it a point to acknowledge the importance of freedom of 
expression, especially in public discourse.100 In its parting words, the Second 
Circuit gave a direct message to the President, the plaintiffs, and the public 
as a whole: “In resolving this appeal, we remind the litigants and the public 
that if the First Amendment means anything, it means that the best response 
to disfavored speech on matters of public concern is more speech, not less.”101 
E. Post-Knight Response 
     Since the lower court’s ruling in Knight, reception of the new rule among 
the courts has generally been positive. In the same jurisdiction, the court for 
the Southern District of New York has already begun to lay the foundation 
to adopt this rule on a widespread level.102 In Price v. City of New York, the 
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99.  Id. at 240. 
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plaintiff began posting critical comments on @NYPD28Pct, the 28th Precinct 
of the New York Police Department’s Twitter account.103 In response, the 
plaintiff was blocked from the account and could no longer use her account 
to comment on any of the tweets posted by @NYPD28Pct.104 In bringing a 
suit against the precinct, the plaintiff alleged that her First Amendment rights 
were violated since the government itself engaged in viewpoint 
discrimination by prohibiting her from voicing her opinions on the site.105 
While the court did not employ the Knight test, this was merely because the 
plaintiff failed to frame her argument “in a manner that tracks the analysis in 
[Knight].”106 Had the plaintiff done so, it seems that the court would have 
adopted the analysis to determine the outcome.107 
     The impact of Knight, however, has not been limited to the Southern 
District of New York, or even the Second Circuit. In Davison v. Randall, the 
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals also adopted a path of analysis similar to 
that of the Second Circuit.108 The public official in question, Phyllis Randall, 
was the chair for the Loudoun County Board of Supervisors.109 Instead of 
creating a Twitter account, Ms. Randall created a Facebook Page devoted to 
her campaign and labeled it under the tag of “government official.”110 After 
creating the Page, in a similar way to President Trump, Ms. Randall elicited 
public discussion on her Page by stating “I really want to hear from ANY 
Loudoun citizen on ANY issues, request, criticism, complement or just your 
thoughts.”111 However, when the plaintiff began to criticize Ms. Randall on 
the Page, Ms. Randall deleted a critical post that the plaintiff left on the Page 
and blocked the plaintiff’s account from viewing and commenting on the 
Page.112 The plaintiff brought suit alleging a violation of the First 
Amendment.113  
     In response, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals created a framework that 
is strikingly similar to the framework created in Knight.114 First, the Fourth 
Circuit concluded that Ms. Randall’s overt declaration that the space was 
                                                
103.  Id. at *7. 
104.  Id. at *7–8. 
105.  Id. at *24–25. 
106.  Id. at *27–28. 
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intended to be used by the general public was sufficient to demonstrate that 
the public official intended to create the forum.115 This, the court 
acknowledged, was significant considering that the Page and Facebook were, 
in general, compatible with expressive activity.116 Also, the court cited to 47 
U.S.C. § 230(a)(3) to bolster its conclusion that “the internet” is “a forum for 
a true diversity of political discourse, unique opportunities for cultural 
development, and myriad avenues for intellectual activity.”117  
     Second, the majority concluded that the Page was subject to government 
control since Ms. Randall maintained “significant control” over the relevant 
aspects of the Page.118 This is because Ms. Randall “had authority to ban 
Facebook profiles or Pages from using the Chair’s Facebook Page—and, 
therefore, the interactive component of the page—authority she exercised in 
banning [the defendant’s account].”119 These findings led the court to 
conclude that, like the @realDonaldTrump account, the Page was a public 
forum, and the block was impermissible viewpoint discrimination.120 
Davison demonstrates that the trend that began in Knight is already 
becoming widespread and, in all likelihood, will be an issue that will be heard 
by the United States Supreme Court soon. 
III. LONG-TERM IMPACT OF KNIGHT 
     With these new rulings from the Second and Fourth Circuit, Knight could 
signal a significant change in public forum jurisprudence that would have a 
wide-reaching impact on the use of private social media platforms. This rule 
would apply to more than accounts owned by single individuals, as President 
Trump asserted in his appellate brief.121 This rule would apply to all 
government-run social media accounts. In fact, even though the Second 
Circuit only decided Knight within the past year, there have already been 
significant cases that have adopted the court’s approach to government-run 
social media pages. Given how popular the use of social media has become 
among government actors, it is time to take a step back and look at the 
broader scope of the impact a rule like this could generate. This section will 
identify potential negative impacts that may arise from the rule that 
government-run social media pages should be classified as public fora. 
                                                
115.  Id. at 682. 
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117.  Id. (quoting Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997)). It is 
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118.  Id. at 683. 
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120.  Davison, 912 F.3d at 688. 
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     In analyzing the application of the doctrine of public fora to social media 
pages, there are three areas that are a cause for concern. First, private 
companies operating social media sites retain a troubling amount of control 
over their pages and users. While it may be true that the government 
maintains some control over these social media pages, there is a significant 
distinguishing factor between the social media pages here and other public 
fora: the companies that own the platforms maintain a higher degree of 
private control over the speech that takes place within their platform. 
Specifically, the control that is reserved by social network sites is so great that 
no page, post, or even comment section can possibly be classified as a public 
forum.  
     The second concern involves the ever-changing, take-it-or-leave-it terms 
of service. These terms subject the users of the respective platforms to some 
odd and, at times, concerning requirements in order to not be permanently 
banned from the platform. Finally, there are significant privacy concerns 
revolving around the users’ data stored on the site. In order for a member of 
the general public to participate in the public forum, they must subject 
themselves to potentially invasive data mining and targeted advertising, all 
for the benefit of the private company. Therefore, contrary to the Second 
Circuit’s assertion, dialogue on social media platforms cannot be classified as 
“otherwise-open.”122 
A. Private Control over Public Fora 
     The first issue that should be taken into account is the level of control that 
private companies retain over these so-called public fora. As previously 
mentioned, a threshold issue for a public forum analysis is whether the 
government retains sufficient control over the forum in question.123 
However, courts have not sufficiently discussed the massive amount of 
control that the social media sites retain over the government’s social media 
page and its comment section. Any analysis that has been directed toward the 
issue has been cursory at best. For example, the Southern District of New 
York in Knight only made brief mention of this concern in a passing 
comment.124 The court noted that even though Twitter is “a private (though 
publicly traded) company” that owns the platform, it did not give any 
consideration to the amount of control that the company has over its users’ 
                                                
122.  Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226, 230 (2d 
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speech and ability to participate on the platform.125 Instead, the bulk of the 
analysis focused on the control that Twitter shares with the user—in this case, 
President Trump.126 However, the power given to the “owner” of the account 
is only derived from the power that Twitter inherently holds over its users. 
     The Second Circuit in Knight and the Fourth Circuit in Davison relied 
heavily on the Supreme Court’s decision in Cornelius v. NAACP Legal 
Defense & Education Fund to conclude that a public forum may exist on 
private property.127 However, as noted by the Southern District of New York 
in Knight, this does not mean that the control element is ignored; rather, the 
government must still maintain sufficient control over the forum in 
question.128 Unfortunately, the Knight court and the Davison court gave no 
consideration to the concurrent control that the account holder and private 
company share over the account.129 This is because the Supreme Court has 
not analyzed a scenario where the government and a private entity have 
concurrent control over the speech of those participating in the forum in 
question. Instead, the Court has focused on cases where the government has 
exclusive control over the property and the ability to silence those on the 
property.130 For example, a public forum may exist in a theater that is rented 
by the government for expressive purposes.131 In the present issue, the “lease” 
includes a provision that the legal owner of the forum may regulate the users’ 
speech. Even though the individual’s name appears on the social media 
account, the private company maintains legal title over the page and may 
revoke the individual’s privileges at any time. 
     This scenario presents an entirely novel question that must be taken into 
account when determining the categorization of the property. Otherwise, this 
rule could have a massive negative impact on all public fora going forward. 
Picture a scenario where the government leases a building where the public 
is free to converse and discuss issues with each other and government 
officers. However, while the public is conversing, the person that owns the 
building is listening to every conversation that is taking place and has the 
ability to throw out the individuals who violate his own personal rules 
without due process. At this point, the restrictions that the private company 
places on those utilizing the property are so pervasive that it distinguishes 
itself from any other case that the Supreme Court has previously decided. 
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Thus, these additional restrictions must be considered when applying the 
doctrine of public fora to these Internet platforms. 
     Further, the terms of service that all users must agree to before they create 
an account on the platform are also binding on the government officials that 
create a profile. Once an account is created on Twitter, the user must enter 
into a contract with the private company (Twitter) before being allowed to 
participate in the forum “designated” by the government. These terms 
expressly identify the types of speech that may not be disseminated on their 
platform.132 Because of this, the private company becomes a gatekeeper to the 
public fora. This is more than the government simply renting an area for use; 
now, Twitter and Facebook serve as “bouncers” to the public fora before 
individuals can even participate in any discussion opened by the government 
actor. 
     To put this idea in perspective, let’s say that a government official created 
a completely government-run social media account, announced to the public 
that the account would be used for the purpose of communicating to and 
with the public, and posted the exact same content that President Trump 
posted on Twitter. However, imagine that the platform in question was not 
Facebook or Twitter; instead, the platform had an overt political or personal 
bias in favor of the public official. While the official would be unable to block 
a user from commenting on his posts, the owner of the website would have 
the unlimited ability to completely remove users from the platform for 
simply posting a contrary view to the official. Such a system would have the 
potential to privatize censorship based on the website or platform where the 
public official chooses to host their “forum.”  
     For example, if President Trump were to create a social media page on a 
platform that was overtly biased toward his policies and ideals, there would 
be nothing holding the platform back from deleting users’ comments and 
banning overly critical users from their platform. While the President would 
not be able to respond to criticism by blocking users, the platform owner 
would have the unlimited authority to do just that. This is the crux of the 
issue: with the amount of private control not even considered in social media 
analysis, a rule like the one adopted by the Fourth Circuit in Knight would 
open the door for a scenario where government officials are encouraged to 
selectively choose the platform that they establish their social media account 
on so that the platform may offer some amount of protection and censorship.  
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B. Troubling Terms of Service 
     In addition to the amount of control that the platform owners wield over 
the users of their own accounts, the reasons users may be banned from the 
platform are subject to change at any point.133 In particular, the reserved 
ability of the respective platforms to change the terms of service raises serious 
concerns regarding the ability of the public to participate in the forums 
designated by the government. 
     Before proceeding, one disclaimer must be made: the point of this analysis 
is not to criticize social media platforms for their policies. As previously 
stated, it is well within the respective platform’s rights to create these 
restrictions on the use of their platforms. Instead, the purpose of this analysis 
is to highlight the platforms’ freedom to restrict speech in a greater capacity 
than the government. Such a system, while beneficial for a private company 
in the free market of ideas, does not fit within concepts of public fora. 
     As previously mentioned, a user must first agree to a site’s lengthy Terms 
of Service and Privacy Policies. However, in the event that an individual reads 
every provision in the site’s terms, this would still not be enough for that user 
to be adequately informed of what the terms may be for the foreseeable 
future. While a user may agree to a current form of the site’s terms and 
conditions, those terms are subject to change at any time. Facebook’s terms 
warn the user that changes will be made “from time to time to accurately 
reflect our services and practices.”134 According to Twitter, they also “may 
revise these Terms from time to time.”135 These vaguely-worded provisions 
can have a significant impact on those using the platform: there are no 
guarantees as to what type of conduct or posts will be allowed on a site for 
the long-term. In fact, the California Court of Appeals ruled in Twitter v. The 
Superior Court for the City and County of San Francisco that Twitter may 
permanently ban users’ accounts for violating new changes to the site’s terms 
of service on the basis of a recent change in Twitter’s terms of service.136 This 
illustrates that these social media sites may change their policies at any time 
                                                
133.  See Twitter Terms of Service, TWITTER (May 25, 2018), https://twitter.com/en/tos (last 
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and be legally justified in deactivating a user’s account on those grounds 
alone. 
     When examining the specific terms of service on both Facebook and 
Twitter, it quickly becomes apparent that these private companies reserve the 
ability to exclude the speech of users for far more reasons than allowed by the 
government under the First Amendment. In addition to the assortment of 
non-speech-related reasons for account suspension, such as six months of 
inactivity on Twitter’s platform,137 there are several speech-related 
restrictions that users must agree to when creating a new account. For 
example, in their respective terms of service, both Facebook and Twitter 
reserve the right to exclude users from their platform if the user uses their 
account to disseminate “hate speech.”138 Both platforms have defined this in 
similar yet distinct ways. For example, Facebook’s Community Guidelines 
have an entire article dedicated to the definition and tier-ranking of hate 
speech, which Facebook defines as follows: 
We define hate speech as a direct attack on people based on 
what we call protected characteristics—race, ethnicity, 
national origin, religious affiliation, sexual orientation, 
caste, sex, gender, gender identity, and serious disease or 
disability. We also provide some protections for 
immigration status. We define attack as violent or 
dehumanizing speech, statements of inferiority, or calls for 
exclusion or segregation.139 
     In a similar way, Twitter defines hateful conduct as the promotion of 
“violence against or direct[] . . . attack[s] or threat[s] [to] other people on the 
basis of race, ethnicity, national origin, sexual orientation, gender, gender 
identity, religious affiliation, age, disability, or serious disease.”140 All of these 
definitions, while within the rights of the platforms to create, are incredibly 
ambiguous. These restrictions limit the amount of freedom that its users may 
exercise on the platforms. This could be incredibly problematic, especially 
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when the restrictions are in a place where First Amendment rights are 
supposed to be guaranteed. 
     While it may seem counter-intuitive for social media platforms to ban 
users from their site for the things that the user says, major social media 
platforms have proven that they can and will exercise this right, even if the 
user has a large following. In late 2018, talking head Alex Jones and his 
organization, Infowars, were permanently banned from all of the most 
popular social media platforms, including Facebook, Twitter, and 
YouTube.141 This move resulted from a long history of Jones making wild and 
unsubstantiated claims, including accusing the government of creating “gay 
bomb[s]” and tainting the water with chemicals that “turn[] the friggin’ frogs 
gay!”142 In one of his most disgusting claims, Jones asserted several times that 
the Sandy Hook massacre was a “hoax” organized by the Obama 
administration.143 These claims, while incredibly disturbing, are likely 
protected under the First Amendment. As ridiculous and infuriating as some 
of these claims are, it is highly unlikely that the government would be justified 
in barring Jones from using his right to free speech in this manner. 
     This, however, does not bar private companies from limiting the type of 
speech that takes place on their respective platforms. Beginning in the latter 
half of 2018, several tech companies began to ban Jones from using their 
platforms to disseminate his opinions.144 On August 6, 2018, Facebook 
announced to the world that it had permanently banned all four of Alex 
Jones’ accounts: “the Alex Jones Channel Page, the Alex Jones Page, the 
InfoWars Page, and the Infowars Nightly News Page.”145 This, according to 
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Facebook, was because the accounts had ignored the warnings that were 
given and the strikes that were placed on the accounts.146 These strikes were 
due to the multiple violations of the community guidelines, including what 
Facebook cited as “glorifying violence” and “dehumanizing language.”147 
Eventually, the violations resulted in a ban on the accounts.148  
     Facebook was not alone in this move; Apple, Google, and Spotify removed 
Jones from their respective platforms all within the same week.149 At the time, 
there was one major platform that remained silent on the Alex Jones 
controversy: Twitter.150 This, presumably, was because Twitter had come 
under fire for seemingly targeting conservative accounts in a move to cut 
down on “fake accounts and automated bot networks.”151 However, after 
pressure from the community, Twitter suspended Jones’ accounts from 
posting for seven days.152 Soon after, on September 6, 2018, Twitter 
announced that they were permanently banning Alex Jones’ and Infowars’ 
account from the platform.153 This was because the accounts violated 
Twitter’s “abusive behavior” policy.154 Twitter also announced that it would 
“continue to evaluate reports we receive regarding other accounts potentially 
associated with [Alex Jones] and will take action if content that violates our 
rules is reported or if other accounts are utilized in an attempt to circumvent 
their ban.”155 
     Actions like those taken by the aforementioned platforms in response to 
Alex Jones are completely independent of the First Amendment. Such a ban 
is well within the rights of the platforms; they have the freedom to limit access 
to and usage of their platform. However, Jones’ claims would likely not be 
censored by the government per the First Amendment. In the wake of the 
Alex Jones ban, Jonathan Zittrain, faculty director of Harvard’s Berkman 
Klein Center for Internet and Society, expressed some concern regarding the 
control that the platforms exercise over its users:  
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While private platforms aren’t bound by the restrictions of 
the First Amendment—generally only the government is—
there’s a question about how much discretion they should 
choose to exercise over what speech they allow to flow 
through them. That question can’t be wisely answered 
without noting how unfortunately central just a few 
intermediaries are—like Apple for podcasts, or YouTube, 
Facebook and Twitter for videos and links.156 
     Zittrain is not alone in his sentiments. Chris Hughes, co-founder of 
Facebook, has publicly decried the influence Facebook has on modern 
culture and how much power rests in the platform’s algorithm.157 With such 
a pervasive amount of control vested in a small group of companies, courts 
should take pause when considering whether a public forum can truly exist 
on platforms such as this. 
     This massive amount of power can be especially problematic if the 
platforms begin to demonstrate a political bias. With the ban of Alex Jones 
from major social media platforms, the Washington Post even expressed 
concern that companies like Facebook and Twitter seemed to take more 
partisan stances in their recent bans of users.158 The Post even noted that the 
platforms have become increasingly willing to ban “abusive” speech “even at 
the risk of impinging on free speech.”159 This was true for Alex Jones; even 
the disgusting assertion that the Sandy Hook massacre was a hoax would 
likely not be subjected to government censorship. Only a private company 
would be constitutionally able to exclude Jones’ speech from its own 
platform. In the context of the present discussion, this would mean that if a 
public forum exists on these private platforms, the companies would have the 
unchecked authority to allow or disallow any sort of speech they desire to 
censor.  
     The power to exclude the speech of users even extends to government-run 
pages. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu utilizes Facebook to 
promulgate government speech to the masses.160 Since it is difficult to 
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maintain an active social media account while running for reelection, the 
Prime Minister utilizes a “chatbot” to help communicate to the public. 
However, during his reelection campaign, the chatbot posted on Facebook 
an incredibly disparaging comment regarding Prime Minister Netanyahu’s 
opposition and the political left.161 Specifically, the chatbot called on users to 
avoid voting for “Arabs who want to destroy us all—women, children and 
men—and allow a nuclear Iran that will kill us.”162 Once again, while these 
statements would likely be permissible under the First Amendment, 
Facebook categorized the post as impermissible hate speech and suspended 
the Prime Minister’s chatbot for twenty-four hours.163 A Facebook 
spokesperson even cautioned that, if there are additional violations, further 
action may be taken against Prime Minister Netanyahu’s account.164 Such 
action is well within the purview of Facebook since they reserve the power to 
shut down pages if they violate the terms of use.165 This further demonstrates 
how little control even government actors have over their own accounts. 
     Because an analysis regarding the platform’s terms and limitations on its 
users is fundamentally missing from both Knight and Davison, the rule that 
was created by both the Second and Fourth Circuits would apply to all 
websites, regardless of their limiting terms, political stance, or required 
agreements for creating an account. In the worst-case scenario, this new 
system could open the door to privatized censorship. The scenario 
mentioned above would become more and more commonplace if courts 
continue to ignore the massive amount of direct control that social media 
platforms have over the speech of their users. Thus, the need for a different 
rule becomes increasingly necessary for the protection of individuals’ First 
Amendment rights. 
C. Problematic Privacy Concerns 
     Even setting aside the concerns around the ever-changing terms of service, 
the current privacy policies of these social media sites present major concerns 
for users’ privacy. These issues highlight the central reason for social media’s 
existence, which is the respective companies’ desire to make a profit. These 
companies can do this in several ways. Facebook generally uses its platform 
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to sell advertising space and collect user data to sell to third parties.166 For 
Twitter, a vast majority of its revenue comes from advertising spaces, while 
the remaining revenue comes from data licensing and users paying Twitter 
to promote their tweets.167 These ways of generating revenue, however, open 
the door to serious privacy concerns for the platform’s users. 
     In 2018, the policies of both Twitter and Facebook recently came under 
serious scrutiny. In that same year, Facebook faced allegations of major 
privacy leaks and the release of users’ data.168 A political data firm, Cambridge 
Analytica, was able to acquire the “identities, friend networks, and ‘likes’” of 
over 50 million Facebook users.169 This data assisted Cambridge in its 
advertising and developing of tools to influence the behavior of American 
voters.170 The data also assisted some politicians who used the data in their 
campaigning to determine where to play political ads.171 In an odd twist, the 
data leak allegedly assisted President Trump in his successful campaign run 
for the 2016 presidency.172 
     This breach of users’ information and privacy shocked the nation. In 
response, both the national and international legal community began to look 
into the matter.173 In the United States, the CEO of Facebook, Mark 
Zuckerberg, was called to testify before Congress regarding the data “leak.”174 
These allegations have led to sanctions placed on the platform for the breach 
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in users’ privacy; specifically, the UK Information Commissioner’s Office 
ruled that Facebook must pay £500,000 for “fail[ing] to sufficiently protect 
the privacy of its users before, during and after the unlawful processing of 
this data.”175 Italy imposed its own sanctions on Facebook by fining the 
company €1 million.176 Additionally, the Federal Trade Commission charged 
Facebook with several violations of a previous settlement agreement between 
the FTC and Facebook.177 In particular, the FTC alleged that the platform lied 
to consumers regarding its control over private information and information 
shared with other companies.178 These allegations led to a record-breaking 
settlement between the FTC and Facebook in the amount of $5 billion.179 In 
the future, Ireland may also impose sanctions on Facebook in the amount of 
$1.6 billion for its violation of users’ privacy in the wake of the Cambridge 
Analytica scandal.180 
     Twitter is currently facing similar privacy troubles in the French legal 
system.181 In August of 2018, a Paris court held that Twitter’s privacy policy 
violated its users’ privacy.182 Instead of focusing on a particular breach of 
privacy with a company like Cambridge Analytica, the Paris court focused 
exclusively on the language of Twitter’s 256 terms of service.183 The court 
ruled that the terms users are forced to accept are “abusive” and allow users’ 
data (particularly users’ uploaded photos) to be “commercially exploited” by 
Twitter.184 This led the court to sanction Twitter by requiring it to change its 
small print.185 
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     Even setting aside the intentional invasions of users’ privacy, social media 
platforms are prone to inadvertently share users’ private information without 
consent. Recently, Twitter admitted to two recent “issues” where users’ 
private data was shared to advertising companies.186 These leaks allowed 
companies to potentially view users’ data including their country code, 
whether and when users engaged with advertisements, and information 
about the ad itself.187 This announcement came on the heels of an 
announcement that another “issue” revealed many users’ tweets to the public, 
even if users wished to keep their tweets private.188  
     Privacy concerns continue to plague social networking sites. While 
America and the rest of the world are left to determine how to protect 
consumers from these massive breaches in privacy, courts are left to grapple 
with the issues of private companies’ rights and rights of the individuals using 
these websites. Unfortunately, when it comes to the law of public fora on 
these sites, courts have paid little to no attention to these concerns. Instead, 
both the Fourth Circuit and the Second Circuit focused on the surface issues 
of superficial control and government authority. This misses the bigger, and 
more troubling, issues that social media can present to its users. Thus, courts 
should take these privacy concerns into account when determining the 
classification of government-run social media accounts.  
IV. ALTERNATIVE THEORY 
     The aforementioned concerns lead to one conclusion: it is illogical for a 
public forum to exist on such a privatized and legally tumultuous platform. 
At the same time, both government officials and their constituents should 
still be able to take advantage of the positive benefits offered by these 
platforms. While the comment sections to social media platforms present 
odd issues involving the First Amendment, the foundational ability of a user 
to create a post on their own account still provides public officials a means of 
directly informing the general public of their policy stances and any relevant 
updates. Thus, it is vital that the courts balance the benefits of social media 
use with the burdens of the legal theory that must be applied. 
A. Perspective 
     While the discussion thus far has centered around the drawbacks of 
government use of social media, it is important to not lose sight of the many 
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benefits that this use has on politics in general. It is true that the comment 
section of social media can present issues. However, this is not to say that 
government entities should stay away from social media—quite the contrary. 
Social media sites have become a way for representatives to quickly and 
directly inform the public of any declarations, updates, or to give their 
constituents a closer look into the political process. This serves as valuable 
insight for the public as a whole. In fact, other legal scholars have identified 
several positive benefits for government use of social media platforms. In one 
of the most comprehensive looks at social media in the public fora, Professor 
Lyrissa Lidsky argues that the government should be incentivized to use 
platforms like Twitter and Facebook to connect with the general public.189  
     In her article Public Forum 2.0, Professor Lidsky identified six societal 
benefits that will incur from the use of these platforms.190 First, officials will 
have direct access to their constituents.191 Second, the audience that will be 
reached generally would not have been reached without the platform.192 
Third, these pages have the potential to build a community among those that 
follow the government official.193 Fourth, these pages allow officials to 
accumulate feedback from their followers so that they may better understand 
the needs of their constituents.194 Fifth, using social media to communicate 
with the masses is faster, cheaper, and more direct than most other forms of 
communication available to public officials.195 Finally, social media allows 
government officials to directly respond and interact with members of the 
community.196 Professor Lidsky observed that this benefit in particular is “a 
key impetus behind government use of social media” since public officials 
want to seem more responsive to their constituents.197 Unfortunately, when 
all of the benefits are analyzed in practice, the fourth and sixth benefits 
identified are both subject to the control of site owners.  
     Not only does government use of social media benefit the government 
officials using the platform, but it also often benefits political constituents.198 
“Citizens have an interest in receiving government information quickly, 
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cheaply, and without distortion.”199 However, it is here that Professor Lidsky 
makes an odd assertion. She argues that social media sites “have the potential 
to advance the First Amendment values of free speech, free association, and 
the petitioning of government for redress of grievances.”200 However, such 
advancement is entirely contingent on the private company that owns the 
forum. First Amendment privileges are in no way guaranteed on private 
Internet platforms where the company restricts the content of its users’ 
speech. Therein lies the true issue with social media sites: free speech is not 
guaranteed on social media platforms. Instead, it can be (and is) consistently 
restricted by the company through the reserved right to change their terms 
of service.201 There are no speech rights on private social networking sites.  
     Even Professor Lidsky concedes that the confusion involved in the public 
forum doctrine can massively deter public officials’ use of social networking 
sites as a way to interact with the general public.202 Unfortunately, this 
confusion and lack of precedent also creates several issues for courts to 
wrestle with, as evidenced in both Knight and Davison. Despite this fact, as 
previously stated, governmental use of social media should not be 
discouraged; there are far too many benefits for public figures to outright 
forego its use. However, the issue arises in the precedent that the rulings in 
Knight and Davison set—particularly by setting the precedent that a private 
company may exercise such intimate control over the discourse that takes 
place in a “public forum.” On the other hand, there are still benefits that 
Professor Lidsky identified that can exist without the use of the platform’s 
comment section.203 These benefits should be fostered. Of course, for this to 
happen, the present rule must be significantly modified to accommodate for 
the benefits of social media use and the limitation of private control. 
B. Proposal 
     When the benefits and burdens of the Knight and Davison rule are 
weighed, it becomes apparent that the negative burdens far outweigh the 
potential benefits. Courts must recognize that social media platforms cannot 
be relied upon to give their users the freedom of speech guaranteed by the 
First Amendment due to the inherent nature of private companies and the 
speech restrictions that they may constitutionally place on their users. At this 
point, courts continue to struggle with the application of the law in a rapidly 
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evolving digital age where the Internet has become central to the lives of 
many. Thus, it is vital that courts take a more thoughtful approach to the 
issue.  
     Therefore, in order to protect the direct communication of public officials 
and the private interests of the public, government-run social media accounts 
should not be considered a public forum. With so much uncertainty 
revolving around the First Amendment as applied to the Internet and social 
media accounts, it would be unwise to create such a significant and 
potentially devastating rule in an area that courts do not fully understand. A 
rushed and ill-informed rule could have lasting implications on all public 
fora, even those public fora that do not exist in the Internet. Instead, until 
such a time that social media posts are not visible to those without an 
account, posts made by public officials should be seen only as public 
declarations. These declarations, even when made on social media platforms, 
would fall under the category of government speech. 
     The Second Circuit and the Fourth Circuit were correct on this point: the 
posts made by government officials on their social media accounts are 
properly classified as government speech.204 Even though the platform itself 
is a public forum, the government officials may still utilize it to further their 
own speech.205 This point can exist independent of the public forum 
analysis.206 That being said, it would be entirely logical to permit the 
government to use the platforms for the purpose of exercising government 
speech. Public officials may still use social media to update their followers 
and inform the general public and their constituents of the policy moves that 
they are making. This portion of the courts’ analysis should remain 
unchanged while the remainder of the analysis should be modified so that 
there is no First Amendment protection for individuals posting comments 
on social media posts made by the public officials. 
C. Benefits of the Alternative 
     Without the framework created in Knight and Davison, there are still 
significant benefits gained through government use of social media. For 
example, public officials will still have direct access to their constituents, 
reach a wider audience, and communicate to the masses in a faster and more 
cost-effective way.207 Further, the general public will receive information in a 
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much more direct and easy-to-access manner.208 While the comments and 
direct replies to posts made by public officials would not be legally protected, 
it is important to recognize the other benefits that ensue from the proposed 
rule: the officials may still use social media to directly disseminate 
information to the public. This system would greatly reduce the risk of either 
private censorship or excessive government regulation of private institutions. 
     It is unfortunate that the proposed alternative does not guarantee direct 
back-and-forth communication between government officials and the 
general public. On the other hand, this alternative does not completely close 
the door for users to comment on public officials’ posts. The only difference 
between the Knight rule and the proposed rule is that there would be no 
guaranteed right to comment on the public official’s posts. However, users 
are already not guaranteed the right to comment on posts or even have an 
account on social media platforms in the first place. Even before the Knight 
rule, users have always been, and will continue to be, subject to the 
restrictions that private companies place on their users. Such is the nature of 
social media and the private marketplace. This proposed rule, however, 
would not grant these companies the ability to exercise authority over the 
speech of individuals whose First Amendment rights are supposed to be 
protected. This outcome is far more preferable to the outcome of the Knight 
rule, as its drawbacks pale in comparison to the potential detriment of 
privatized censorship.  
V. CONCLUSION 
     The aforementioned concerns lead to one conclusion: it is illogical for a 
public forum to exist on a social media platform. Instead, it is far more 
reasonable to allow public officials to use such a platform as a way to 
promulgate government speech and keep the general public informed. 
Adopting the rule used in Knight would set a dangerous precedent while also 
transforming privately owned and regulated platforms into a quasi-public 
forum subject to private censorship. Thus, government-run social media 
accounts and their posts should be relegated to the dissemination of 
informative public declarations. This would protect the public’s freedom of 
speech in public fora from the dangerous potential of censorship by 
companies that operate outside of the bounds of the First Amendment. 
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